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Freezing Out Noncompliant
Ships: Why the Arctic Council
Must Enforce the Polar Code
Richard O.G. Wanerman 1
The International Maritime Organization’s Polar Code is
intended to regulate the nature of commercial shipping in the
Arctic and Antarctic by setting minimum standards for ships
transiting though Polar waters. This region of the world is
unique, and has certain characteristics that make it both
attractive and dangerous. However, the Polar Code, which is
still in draft form, does not currently have an enforcement
mechanism apart from traditional state party monitoring, which
may result in oversights that lead to catastrophic accidents in
remote parts of the Arctic. This Note analyzes how the absence
of a clear enforcement mechanism and uncertainty regarding
the draft Code could result in the failure of the Code to protect
the Arctic while still permitting shipping through it. This Note
further analyzes how the Arctic Council, an institutional
assembly of states with an Arctic territorial presence, could
assume a monitoring and enforcement role within the Polar
Code, due to its existing experience with the Arctic and with its
recent expansion of responsibilities. This Note concludes that
the International Maritime Organization needs an active
enforcement mechanism for the Polar Code to avoid
noncompliance through negligence and the risk of catastrophic
accidents, as well as to encourage industry compliance with the
Code. This Note recommends that the International Maritime
Organization make the Arctic Council and its member states the
enforcement mechanism for the Polar Code, based on the
Council’s prior success with a Search and Rescue Agreement.
These states have the capacity and interest in enforcement, and
can help bring about rapid international acceptance of the Polar
Code as the Arctic Ocean becomes a viable sea route.

1.

Editor-in-Chief, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law;
B.A., Lawrence University (Jun. 2011); J.D., Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (expected May 2015). Thanks to Faculty
Advisor Prof. David Kocan and the staff of the Journal, especially
Jeremy Saks and Garret Bowman, for their advice and assistance on this
Note.
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I. Introduction
The Arctic Ocean is changing faster than the international
community can currently respond. The sea ice is retreating at an
uncomfortably rapid rate, 2 making the Arctic Ocean increasingly
accessible for commercial uses. The Arctic states, with high volumes
of natural commodities found within the Arctic Circle, want to
transport these commodities to market by ship, which remains the
most cost-effective means of cargo and freight transportation. 3 Yet, no
comprehensive, Arctic-centric legal regime currently exists for
shipping regulation. 4 The International Maritime Organization (IMO)
released an official draft of the intended Polar Code for such shipping
in late January, 2014, after many years of work; its projected date of
earliest implementation in 2016. 5 The lack of rapidity regarding such
an agreement is troubling, given the rate of expansion of open water
2.

See, e.g., Rani Gran & Maria-José Viñas, NASA Finds Thickest Parts
of Arctic Ice Cap Melting Faster, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.
(Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/thickmelt.html (detailing the results of satellite analysis regarding the retreat
of sea ice and the ice cap, which results in expanded open water in the
Arctic Ocean).

3.

ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT
76–77 (2009), available at http://www.arctic.gov/ publications/
AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf [hereinafter ARCTIC MARINE
SHIPPING ASSESSMENT].

4.

ØYSTEIN JENSEN, THE IMO GUIDELINES FOR SHIPS OPERATING IN ARCTIC
ICE-COVERED WATERS: FROM VOLUNTARY TO MANDATORY TOOL FOR
NAVIGATION SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION? 5–7 (2007),
available at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R0207.pdf.

5.

See Shipping in Polar Waters: Development of an International Code of
Safety for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, INT’L MAR. ORG. (last
visited Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.imo.org/ MediaCentre/ HotTopics/
polar/Pages/default.aspx [hereinafter Shipping in Polar Waters].
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in the Arctic, 6 and is a policy area into which the Arctic Council must
play a more important role.
An Arctic shipping agreement has been a priority issue for the
Arctic Council since the ministerial meeting in 2000. 7 The IMO, which
had an interim set of guidelines for Polar operations, 8 is now working
on integrating the draft Polar Code into the existing IMO guidelines
for safety and pollution to make it a mandatory instrument. 9
However, neither the existing guidelines nor the final Polar Code will
have active enforcement powers; as a result, “actual application is
evident only through state practice and the extent to which
international shipping complies.” 10 This legal void will pose a serious
problem for the future integrity of the Arctic, and is one that the
Arctic Council should fill. It has already demonstrated its ability to
work together on issues of mutual safety and welfare in the enactment
of a search and rescue agreement (SAR Agreement), 11 and can build
on the principles of that agreement in creating an enforcement regime
for the Polar Code in the Arctic that is amenable to the IMO. Such
role within the pending Polar Code establishes the Council’s position
as a unified body for the region while also establishing a clearly
enforceable legal system for maritime standards in the Arctic by the
states whose shores border it and whose people mostly utilize its
waters. 12
The Arctic Council must have an enforcement role in the Polar
Code for the Code to be effective in the Arctic. Part II will briefly
examine the special nature of the Arctic region, and why close
cooperation between the Arctic Council states is vital to the
successful management of this region. Part III will discuss the nature
of the Polar Code, why it needs an active enforcement mechanism,
and how the recent history of the Arctic Council demonstrates its
viability as the best entity to enforce the Polar Code. Part IV will
6.

See, e.g., Gran & Viñas, supra note 1.

7.

ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE BARROW DECLARATION: THE SECOND
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL, ¶ 11 (2000), available at
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/
category/5-declarations [hereinafter Barrow Declaration].

8.

See generally INT’L MAR. ORG., GUIDELINES FOR SHIPS OPERATING IN
POLAR WATERS (2010), available at http://www.imo.org/ Publications/
Documents/ Attachments/ Pages%20from%20E190E.pdf [hereinafter
Polar Code].

9.

See Shipping in Polar Waters, supra note 4.

10.

See JENSEN, supra note 3, at v.

11.

See Secretary Clinton Signs the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement
with Other Arctic Nations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 12, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163285.htm

12.

See ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 77.
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then lay out the appearance of the proposed enforcement regime. Part
V will conclude with a look at the future of binding Arctic Council
agreements and cooperation with the IMO on matters of Arctic Ocean
affairs.

II. The Special Nature of the Arctic
The Arctic is a global region with unique characteristics. Of the
Arctic’s approximately thirty million square kilometers, 13 fourteen
million are water. 14 Ice covers the majority of this water for most of
the year. 15 Unlike any other ocean in the world, landmasses almost
entirely surround the Arctic Ocean, with only a few notable points of
clear transit to either the Pacific or Atlantic Oceans. In essence, it is
a semi-enclosed sea. 16 Four million people live within this thirty
million square kilometer region, a mix of indigenous peoples and
settlers from southern locations. The majority of these people rely on
the Arctic Ocean in some capacity for their existence in the far
north. 17 This permanent population also lives in an environmentally
extreme, yet also very sensitive, region of the world. The Arctic region
is defined by its extremes and its cold. The Arctic Circle, the
commonly accepted delimitation of the Arctic region, is defined as the
southernmost boundary of 24-hour sunlight at the Summer Solstice,
as well as the northernmost boundary of 24-hour darkness at the
Winter Solstice. 18 That darkness aids in the constant cooling of the
seawater into nearly impenetrable ice, 19 which has been an assumed
factor in Arctic navigation for centuries. 20
13.

JENSEN, supra note 3, at 1.

14.

ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 16.

15.

JENSEN, supra note 3, at 1.

16.

ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 18 (2009).
Although a number of rocky archipelagos lie at the outer edges of the
accepted boundary of the Arctic Ocean, through which one could
theoretically travel to leave Arctic waters, the two main points of entry
and exit from the Arctic Ocean are: the Fram Strait between Greenland
and Svalbard, which connects to the Atlantic Ocean; and the Bering
Strait, between Alaska and eastern Russia, which connects to the Pacific
Ocean. Map of the Arctic Ocean, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR. (last
visited Nov. 10, 2013), http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/map-of-thearctic-ocean/. However, unlike the Mediterranean Sea, a classic example
of a closed sea, the exchange of water into and out of the Arctic Ocean
is much greater, thus not making it a true closed sea. ARCTIC MARINE
SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 16.

17.

JENSEN, supra note 3, at 1.

18.

See ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 19.

19.

See id. at 20.

20.

See id. at 25.
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This old way of thinking about Arctic navigation is rapidly
evolving due to the effects of climate change. Satellite scans of the
Arctic over the past thirty years demonstrate a rapid loss of sea ice
during the summer months, and predictive models do not show any
replacement of the lost ice. 21 By 2050, the Arctic Council believes that
the Arctic Ocean will have a completely ice-free summer, permitting
full circumnavigation of the Arctic Ocean by cargo ships.22 While this
is a crisis from an environmental standpoint, it is a strategic gauge
from a shipping standpoint. More ship traffic could enter the Arctic,
and with the effects of the increased traffic in an environmentally
weakened region yet unknown, the international legal regimes have
yet to adequately address the potential impact of such activity. 23
Even with the presence of permanent sea ice closer to the North
Pole and Northern Pole of Inaccessibility, 24 the Arctic environment
and human knowledge of the Arctic presents certain distinct
challenges for shipping, which forms part of the basis for the creation
of the Polar Code. Only two main sea routes exist within the
boundary of the Arctic Ocean, the Northern Sea Route and the
Northwest Passage. 25 Although mariners have now used both these
routes for some years, their conditions are still not fully known, as the
Arctic Ocean is the least studied of the world’s oceans, and thus most
hazardous for mariners. 26 The constant presence of ice (for now)
requires both certain kinds of ships and a certain level of competency
with Arctic waters, which functionally limits many Arctic maritime
operations to Arctic states. 27 Further, even if Arctic sea ice becomes
permanently smaller and weaker than it is today, such ice will still
require monitoring by authorities and care by mariners to avoid any
catastrophic disasters in a part of the world from that it is very
difficult to be rescued. 28

21.

See id. at 26–27.

22.

Id. at 27.

23.

See JENSEN, supra note 3, at 3–4.

24.

The Pole of Inaccessibility is the point in the Arctic Ocean furthest from
any coastline, and thus the most difficult to reach in an emergency. It is
located at 84° 3’ N, 174° 51’ W. ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT,
supra note 2, at 27.

25.

These routes will be described infra, Part IV.

26.

ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 16.

27.

See JENSEN, supra note 3, at 3–4.

28.

See ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 25
(emphasizing that, even with climate change that severely reduces the
extent of permanent polar ice, “there will always be Arctic sea ice cover
to contend with”); see JENSEN, supra note 3, at 3–4 (recounting the
near-sinking incident of the T/S Maxim Gorky in 1989 and the extreme
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III. The Need for an Enforceable Polar Code
The predicted rise in maritime activity in the Arctic and the very
delicate nature of the Arctic environment require a substantial
response on the part of the Arctic Council states soon if they wish to
achieve an effective solution to a growing problem. The coordinate
factors of climate change and resource extraction are pushing
maritime activity northward, 29 into a part of the world that is rather
small and ecologically sensitive, yet does not currently have an
effective means of policing who goes into the Arctic and how they
operate in the region. Although a combination of international legal
standards theoretically governs regional maritime activity, none is yet
comprehensive and region-specific. 30 The Polar Code will provide the
regulatory framework necessary to ensure the integrity of future
Arctic shipping, but will leave no functional enforcement mechanism.
This leaves the Arctic Council as the international body best suited to
enforce the Polar Code and to establish the way forward in Arctic
maritime affairs. Part A will discuss how the Arctic will become a
more viable way of shipping goods around the world. Part B will
discuss how the existing legal framework governing any Arctic
shipping is inadequate to the pressing needs of the Arctic region. Part
C will discuss how the Polar Code will make Arctic shipping a more
viable and safe option for international trade, but also point out its
flaws. Part D will use the Arctic Council’s SAR Agreement as a point
of legal precedent for how the Arctic Council can act as an
enforcement arm of the Polar Code.
A. The Northward Push of Shipping

The Arctic Ocean is the last frontier in commercial shipping,
capturing the imagination of merchant traders and explorers for
centuries. It is also increasingly becoming a realistic means of
transporting goods and commodities around the world, saving time
and fuel for large container ships moving between Northern
Hemisphere ports. 31 Without a comprehensive regulatory system for
deciding which ships may operate in the Arctic, the international
conditions encountered by the ship, crew, and passengers “despite the
prompt Norwegian reaction”).
29.
30.

See JENSEN, supra note 3, at 3.
See RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41153, CHANGES
ARCTIC: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 20 (2013).

IN

THE

31.

See Heike Deggim, Int’l Mar. Org., Mar. Tech. Section, Progress
Toward the Development of an International Polar Code, presented at
the Annual General Meeting of the Royal Institute of Naval Architects
(Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.imo.org/ MediaCentre/
HotTopics/polar/Documents/polar%20RINA%2004-13.pdf.
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community and the Arctic region will have a difficult task of ensuring
the reliability of all the ships that want to use the Arctic sea routes.
Shipping in the Arctic primarily occurs on two major routes: the
Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. The Northern Sea
Route is almost entirely within Russian territorial waters, and runs
along Russia’s northern shore. Under Russian law, its route is set
from the Kara Gate to the Bering Strait, and runs 2,551 nautical
miles; from the Bering Strait to Murmansk, Russia’s largest port at
the western end of the Northern Sea Route, it is 3,074 nautical miles.
32
For a hypothetical transit from the port of Rotterdam to the port
of Yokohama, the current route through the Suez Canal, Gulf of
Aden, and Straits of Malacca is up to 4,500 nautical miles longer than
using the Northern Sea Route. Thus, opening up this route to
commercial shipping would save on the cost and duration of
intercontinental shipments. 33 The Northern Sea Route, however,
remains little used outside of local Russian traffic. 34 Although four
ships fully transited the route in 2010, which increased to 46 by the
2012 shipping season, it remains relatively untested for regular use.35
Further, the Northern Sea Route poses significant navigational
challenges for the untrained mariner. Almost the entire length of the
Northern Sea Route has depths of fewer than 100 meters, and in
certain key areas can be as shallow as 10 meters, necessarily
restricting the dimensions of the ships permitted to transit it.36
Although Russian authorities do monitor ships currently using the
Northern Sea Route, the impact on ships that do not ordinarily
transit the Northern Sea Route is unknown.
The Northwest Passage, the Western Hemisphere’s counterpart to
the Northern Sea Route, is the more heavily explored, if less direct,
Arctic shipping route. Indeed, the Arctic Council identifies five routes
through which ships may use the Northwest Passage, though not all

32.

ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 23. The Kara
Gate is the water passage between the island of Novaya Zemlya and the
Russian mainland. See id.

33.

Deggim, supra note 30.

34.

O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 17. The Northern Sea Route has also
suffered from a lack of global exposure. Although officially opened to
commercial traffic by the Soviet Union in 1931, the route remained
exclusively under Soviet control for the next sixty years, until the Soviet
authorities finally opened the route to international traffic in 1991. Id.

35.

Scott Borgerson, The Coming Arctic Boom, FOREIGN AFF., Jul.-Aug.
2013, at 76, 82.

36.

ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 23. At its
eastern entry point, north of the Bering Strait, the Northern Sea
Route’s depth is only 10 meters, forcing Russian maritime authorities to
restrict access to ships with a draft of no greater than 6.7 meters. Id.
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five routes are considered suitable for shipping. 37 Generally, it is
roughly 2,400 kilometers in length, from Baffin Island to Alaska,
running along the northern Canadian shore and through the many
archipelagos of the Canadian Arctic. 38 In a hypothetical routing from
the port of Rotterdam to the port of San Francisco, the Northwest
Passage route would be at least 3,900 nautical miles shorter than the
current route through the Panama Canal. 39 Although once believed to
be the fastest route between Europe and Asia, the reality of the
Northwest Passage is a more complex balancing of ease of navigation
and absence of ice. The southern routes of the Northwest Passage
have less ice year-round, but also pose threats to navigation, both
from the narrowness of the channels and the water depth. The
northern routes are deeper, but have more year-round sea ice, and
thus are less consistently reliable. 40
These two routes combine to serve an expanding economic zone
that makes the Arctic more of a destination and origin region at the
moment than a transiting region. Almost all the cargo ships in the
region arrive to deliver supplies to Arctic communities and to natural
resource extraction facilities, and leave with natural resource
commodities. Resource extraction is becoming a key element of future
Arctic development, with Russia becoming very active in drilling, and
making no indications that it will reduce its extraction in the near
future. 41 The United States has also had long-term interests in natural
resource extraction from the Arctic. Although the Alaska Pipeline has
long been a major outlet for American Arctic oil, the Obama
administration has expressed interest in studying the viability of
Northwest Passage shipping for natural resources, 42 which has thus far
been absent from any American strategic plans. 43 When cruise ships
37.

Id. at 21.

38.

Id. at 20.

39.

Deggim, supra note 30.

40.

O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 17 In a footnote to the report, O’Rourke
posits that shipping firms might find the transcontinental railroad
routes in Canada and the United States to be a faster means of moving
goods and commodities from the Atlantic to the Pacific than the
Northwest Passage. This author believes this statement to be partly
political, given the nature of the intended audience of the report. Id.

41.

See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer & Clifford Krauss, Russia Embraces
TIMES
(Feb.
15,
2011),
Offshore
Arctic
Drilling,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/business/global/16arctic.html?pa
gewanted=all.

42.

See EXEC. OFF. PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC
REGION 5 (May 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.

43.

Borgerson, supra note 34, at 88.
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do enter the Arctic, they do not typically do so to transit the length
of either the Northern Sea Route or the Northwest Passage, but
rather to visit the environmental tourism sites of Greenland,
Svalbard, and Jan Mayen. 44
B. The Patchwork Nature of Existing International Law in the Arctic

The Arctic is not without coverage by binding international law,
but none of the existing laws adequately addresses Arctic-specific
needs. Several general agreements cover Arctic shipping, but only
insofar as they are binding on all ships throughout the world. The
Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) addresses the requirements
for crew and passenger well-being in the event of an emergency at sea.
The Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers (STCW) addresses the minimum competency requirements
for crew and officers onboard ships. These agreements, overseen by
the IMO, are designed for general global use, from tropical waters to
polar seas, and offer a baseline for global marine standards.45
However, none specifically covers the particular nature of Arctic
maritime conditions, with its consistently shallow and frigid waters.
Additionally, since existing IMO regulations depend on flag state
enforcement, some ships wishing to access Arctic ports may fall short
of the necessary requirements because of the known lax enforcement
found on ships operating under flags of convenience. 46 Since crew and
passenger welfare are vital when operating in polar waters, allowing a
ship that operates under a flag of convenience in accordance with the
existing IMO regime could be a genuine hazard to the environment of
the Arctic.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) is a major governing agreement for the Arctic Ocean that
provides a framework for future rules regarding shipping. 47 Despite its
near-universal acceptance, and its passage into customary
international law, its application in the Arctic has problems. First, the
United States is not yet a party to UNCLOS, and while the United
States does accept UNCLOS as customary international law, it does
not yet enforce some of the provisions of UNCLOS through state
44.

O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 18. Tourism through the sea routes is not
impossible, however: the M/S Explorer transited through the Northwest
Passage, following the route taken by Road Amundsen, in 1984. ARCTIC
MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2 at 21.

45.

O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 20.

46.

Id. at 20–21. While the majority of shipping lines are based in developed
states, many elect to register their ships in such countries as Panama,
Liberia, the Bahamas, the Marshall Islands, Cyprus, and Malta, due to
their attractive tax structures and the nature of their ship inspection
regimes. Id.

47.

ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 50.
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mechanisms. 48 Second, even if the United States were a party to
UNCLOS, Article 234, which addresses ice-covered waters, is
controversial. Nominally, it is intended to allow states with claims to
ice-covered waters to regulate shipping activities in those waters to
minimize the environmental effects of the transit while still permitting
free navigation. 49 Yet, this implicit allowance of some sovereign
control over free navigation has been regarded as “‘probably the most
ambiguous, if not controversial, clause in the entire treaty,’” due to
the lack of clear interpretation as to what the UNCLOS drafters
meant by certain elements of the text. 50 Thus, the international
community has yet to come to a consensus on how to address special
issues of Arctic maritime operations.
C. The State of the Polar Code

The IMO has been working on the Polar Code, the future binding
guidelines for Arctic maritime operations, for over ten years. 51 Since
2002, it has released the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar
Waters (IMO Guidelines). Created out of a need for some form of
standards for shipping in the sensitive polar regions, the IMO
Guidelines establish target safety goals for commercial ships operating
in commonly-recognized Arctic and Antarctic waters. 52 The IMO
Guidelines also establish the concept of a Polar-class ship, one that
would be certified to operate in polar regions with minimal concerns
for the safety and integrity of the vessel and crew. 53 The IMO has
now released the codified form of the guidelines as the Polar Code,
though due to the nature of the Code and existing IMO regulations,
its earliest implementation date is scheduled to be in 2016. 54
The current form of the IMO Guidelines, adopted in late 2009,55
form a comprehensive regulatory structure for almost all matters
48.

See Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions
to the Convention and the Related Agreements as at 29 October 2013,
U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFF. & L. SEA (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_rat
ifications.htm (noting the absence of the United States).

49.

JENSEN, supra note 3, at 6–7.

50.

Id. at 7.

51.

See O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 21.

52.

See generally Polar Code, supra note 7.

53.

Polar Code, supra note 7, at ch. 1.1.3.

54.

See generally Shipping in Polar Waters, supra note 4.

55.

Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar
Waters, IMO Assemb. Res. A.1024 (26) (Dec. 2, 2009), at 1, available at
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=29985&filena
me=A1024(26).pdf [hereinafter Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar
Waters].
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related to ship operations in the designated Arctic and Antarctic
zones, from construction to crewing to emergency operations. 56 New
ship design for the Polar regions must conform to a set of
requirements that depend on (1) when the ship will transit through
the Polar regions, and (2) the conditions of the sea ice at the time of
the transit. 57 Regardless of the specific timing and type of transit,
Polar-class ships must all conform to certain minimum environmental
minimum requirements, including: a more rigorous construction
method of double hulls and double bottoms for all ships, especially
those carrying hazardous cargoes; 58 having engineering plants and
electrical machinery that can withstand the cold and rigors of ice; 59
minimizing the crew’s exposure to frigid exterior conditions; 60 having
lifesaving equipment on-board specifically designed for cold-weather
operations; 61 and special navigational equipment that enhance the
ability of the officers to navigate through polar waters. 62 It establishes
the position of Ice Navigator, a new officer of the deck department
whose task is to monitor polar waters for any ice that places the
integrity of the ship at risk. It is a position for which “consideration
should be…given…when planning voyages into polar waters.” 63 The
requirements are significant, and are a sizable expansion to the
requirements already imposed by the IMO on commercial vessels, but
are necessary to ensure the integrity of ships and crews navigating
through these waters. The recent experience of the M/V Akademik
Shokalskiy in the Antarctic speaks to the omnipresent dangers to
ships in the Polar regions, even those like the Akademik Shokalskiy,
which were designed for such waters. 64 The maritime community
needs a strong polar code to ensure that the Akademik Shokalskiy is
not another Exxon Valdez. 65
56.

Id. at 4.

57.

Id. at 10 (explaining the seven classes of Polar ships and the specific
conditions through which these ships may operate).

58.

Id. at 14.

59.

Id. at 14–15.

60.

Id. at 17–19.

61.

Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, supra note 54, at 21–
24.

62.

Id. at 24–27.

63.

Id. at 11.

64.

See Henry Fountain, Second Icebreaker Nears Ship Stranded off
Antarctica, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/12/30/world/antarctica-ship.html.

65.

See Philip Shabecoff, Largest U.S. Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 Barrels
of Oil off Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1989, at A1, available at
ProQuest.
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The existing IMO Guidelines, however, have many flaws if they
are to be implemented as is in the Polar Code. First, the IMO
Guidelines are just that – guidelines. They are not currently binding,
and Polar-class ships so far exist primarily on paper. 66 While the IMO
has a timeline for implementation of the Code based on the
Guidelines, its recent history with acceptance of its guidelines and
regulations is frustrating. At the 2012 conference of the Marine
Environment Protection Committee, the IMO Secretary-General
pledged at the opening of the conference that binding greenhouse gas
limitations would be in force worldwide by 2015. 67 However, certain
major maritime nations, such as China and Brazil, sought concessions
on the emissions reduction quantity, frustrating the intent of the
IMO. 68 At the end of that week, IMO Secretary-General Koji
Sekimizu voiced the IMO’s frustration at its member states’ failure to
achieve meaningful progress, stating, “I have, at this moment, no idea
how we can achieve [a binding greenhouse gas emissions protocol].” 69
This recent history demonstrates that the IMO’s enforcement
capabilities through mutual cooperation are not strong on potentially
controversial issues such as greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, if an issue
as important as the Polar Code is to have full acceptance, it needs an
enforcement mechanism to avoid the kind of standards reduction and
possible regulatory avoidance seen with the greenhouse gas
conference.
Second, the Code would only apply to ships greater than 500
gross tons engaging in international voyages. Domestic, security, and
leisure voyages are not covered under the current IMO Guidelines.70
Even with fishing vessels, only those with a length of at least 12
meters are treated by the IMO, and vessels between 12 meters and 24
66.

See generally INT’L ASS’N OF CLASSIFICATION SOC’YS, REQUIREMENTS
CONCERNING POLAR CLASS (2011), available at http://www.iacs.org.uk/
document/public/Publications/Unified_requirements/PDF/UR_I_pdf4
10.pdf.

67.

Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), 63rd Session, 27
February to 2 March 2012: Opening Address by IMO Secretary-General
Koji Sekimizu, INT’L MAR. ORG. (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.imo.org/
MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/SecretaryGeneralsSpeechesToMeetings/Pages/MEPC-63-Opening.aspx.

68.

David Thorpe, IMO Failure to Tackle Shipping Emissions May Force
EU Action, LINK2 (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.link2portal.com/imofailure-tackle-shipping-emissions-may-force-eu-action.

69.

Marine Environment Policy Committee (MEPC), 63rd Session, 27
February to 2 March 2012 (closing remarks): Closing Remarks by IMO
Secretary-General Koji Sekimizu, INT’L MAR. ORG. (Mar. 2, 2012),
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/SecretaryGeneralsSpeechesToMeetings/Pages/MEPC-63-closing.aspx.
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O’ROURKE, supra note 29, at 21 (2013).
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meters operate under a voluntary regime. 71 Although all are bound by
existing rules regarding oil in marine environments, they are still
subject to domestic laws rather than international ones with respect
to their operations in the Arctic. And even though many domestic
laws regarding ship standards in the Arctic are robust and wellenforced, they are not standardized. 72 This can be a liability in a
region as compact as is the Arctic. Thus, since the Arctic Council
states promulgate the domestic laws governing fishing vessel
standards, and since the Arctic Council states enforce these standards
on their own vessels in the Polar Code zone, the IMO ought to
include the Arctic Council as an enforcement body in its final draft of
the Polar Code.
D. Lessons from the SAR Agreement

If the Arctic Council does take an enforcement role with the Polar
Code, such a role needs to follow the precedents the Council has set
for itself regarding the enforcement of its own agreements. Swedish
Foreign Minister Carl Bildt’s succinct description of the work style of
the Council—”[f]irmly based in established principles of international
law, but with particular responsibilities for the directly adjacent
nations” 73—formed the basis of the first binding, enforceable
agreement created under the auspices of the Arctic Council, the
Search and Rescue Agreement (SAR Agreement). Although search
and rescue is a clearer point of unified action than other key Arctic
issues, the SAR Agreement is nevertheless a useful template for how
the Arctic Council can better assert itself on the world stage when
other international organizations are unable or unwilling to do so in a
region as sensitive as the Arctic.
The terms of this agreement mark a critical path forward for the
Arctic Council with respect to its ability to enforce binding
agreements in a unified manner. This agreement is narrow in scope—
it does not seek to overhaul the entire Arctic Council’s existing
structure, nor directly impede on existing agreements or applicable
international law. However, despite its narrow scope, it has broadreaching implications for relations among the Arctic states. The
agreement finalizes territorial claims on a functional basis by
delimiting which states have search and rescue priorities within the

71.

Deggim, supra note 30.

72.

JENSEN, supra note 3, at 7–8.

73.

Carl Bildt, Op-Ed., Northern Beacon, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/opinion/global/Carl-Bildt-Whythe-Arctic-Council-Matters.html.
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Arctic zone. 74 This establishes the Arctic Council’s ability to function
as both an administrative and an enforcement body, even when
conceding that international legal disputes may yet alter the specifics
of the agreement. 75
The SAR Agreement also asserts certain minimum levels of
information sharing and standards regulation, which is a necessary
element of a unified Polar Code enforcement scheme. Article 9 of the
Agreement lays out the minimum ways in which the states must
cooperate with each other, which includes but is not limited to:
sharing of communications and meteorological information; sharing of
resources; knowledge of each other’s search-and-rescue capabilities;
and supporting joint initiatives to improve search-and-rescue in the
Arctic. 76 The 2009 Tromsø Declaration asks that the same
interactions occur regarding shipping and maritime standards, noting
that increased marine access to the Arctic will require greater
cooperation amongst the Arctic Council states to craft a suitable
policy. 77
Finally, the provision allowing for periodic review and revision of
the Agreement is highly significant for the Arctic Council and perhaps
for the Polar Code. Up until 2011, the Council served as a body
through which the Arctic states could confer on issues and policy of
mutual import, but has few actual powers. With this regular meetings
provision, however, the Arctic Council was able to fulfill the promise
of the Nuuk Declaration of 2011. 78 Now, it can position itself to
become a more significant international legal body by reviewing
agreements for what works and what does not, and seek to improve
on the shortcomings of the Arctic Council’s binding agreements. This
framework can be extended to an enforcement mechanism of the
Polar Code, by using the institutional body of the Arctic Council as a
means of improving on Polar shipping while conserving the Polar
environment.
74.

Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and
Rescue in the Arctic, Multilateral (Arctic Council), May 12, 2011,
T.I.A.S. No. 13-119 [hereinafter SAR Agreement].
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Id. (“The delimitation of search and rescue regions is not related to and
shall not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between States or
their sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction.”).
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Id.
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See ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE TROMSØ DECLARATION: THE SIXTH
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 4 (2009), available at
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/
category/5-declarations [hereinafter Tromsø Declaration].
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See ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE NUUK DECLARATION: THE SEVENTH
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 2 (2011), available at
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/
category/5-declarations [hereinafter Nuuk Declaration].
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IV. Why the Arctic Council Must Become Involved in
the Polar Code
The Arctic Council has already expressed its interest in having a
binding shipping agreement for the Arctic, and now is the time for the
Council to act on that interest and integrate its interests into the
Polar Code. The Council has addressed the need for a shipping
agreement many times in its seventeen-year history, starting with the
Barrow Declaration in 2000 that endorsed the work of the IMO in
creating what would become the IMO Guidelines. 79 In 2006, the
Arctic Council emphasized its desire to promote greater cooperation
among its member states regarding standards for marine safety,
emphasizing the desire for the Arctic Council states to find a
collective solution to a pending problem. 80 The Council grew more
concerned in its Tromsø Declaration of 2009, urging the IMO to make
its IMO Guidelines mandatory. The Council specifically requested
that “global IMO ship safety and pollution preventions conventions
be augmented with specific mandatory requirements or other
provisions for ship construction, design, equipment, crewing, training
and operations, aimed at safety and protection of the Arctic
environment.” 81 The Arctic Council has reiterated the Tromsø request
since 2009, urging the IMO to complete the work of the Polar Code in
2011, 82 and encouraging greater cooperation between the Arctic
Council and the IMO in 2013. 83
The logical nexus of these parallel interests is the inclusion of the
Arctic Council as both an advisory and enforcement arm of the Polar
Code in the Arctic. While the IMO has expertise in the field of
maritime shipping, the Arctic Council has expertise in Arctic affairs,
and recognizes the interconnected nature of economics, law, and
environment in the Arctic. 84 As Foreign Minister Bildt put it, “[t]he
Arctic Council brings together the eight states, and the indigenous
79.

Barrow Declaration, supra note 6, at ¶ 11.

80.

ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE SALEKHARD DECLARATION: THE FIFTH
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 7–8 (2006), available at
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/
category/5-declarations.
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ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE KIRUNA DECLARATION: THE EIGHTH MINISTERIAL
MEETING OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 4 (2013), available at http://
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peoples, in a pragmatic cooperation to tackle the common challenges
and shape the events ahead of the curve.” 85 The Council empowered
itself in 2011 to act more independently to “address emerging
challenges in the Arctic,” 86 and has set a pattern of making its
decisions “[f]irmly based in established principles of international law,
but with particular responsibilities for the directly adjacent nations.” 87
Further, at the IMO’s recent Workshop in Safe Ship Operations in
the Arctic Ocean, held on February 28, 2014, Prof. Oran Young of the
University of California-Santa Barbara specifically pointed to the
Arctic Council as an institutional body capable of enforcing the Polar
Cod. He focused on the Council’s experience with the SAR Agreement
and a more recent agreement on Arctic marine pollution as indicative
of the Council’s ability to work within the scope of existing IMO
agreements and specifically incorporate and enforce the Polar Code
within the realm of the Arctic Council. 88 Thus, any partnership
between the IMO and the Arctic Council regarding the Polar Code
can and will be mutually beneficial.
The Arctic Council thus has both the capacity and the will to
bring the Polar Code into practical force, based on its analysis of
shipping conditions in its comprehensive 2009 analysis of Arctic
marine shipping. Drawing on data going back to 1970, the Arctic
Council found that sea ice in the Arctic was at its smallest extent in
the mid-2000s. Predictive models then warned of the possibility of a
completely ice-free summer by 2050. 89 This gradual retreat of sea ice
from the Arctic Ocean could permit “the possibility of moving
straight across an ice-free Polar area during parts of the year,”
eliminating the long-term need for the Northern Sea Route and
Northwest Passage. 90 The Arctic Council recognizes this now, while it
is unclear if the IMO does. This ability to merge the Arctic Council’s
environmental data into pressing economic and political problems into
the IMO’s Polar Code work is why the Arctic Council is well suited to
become a future partner for the IMO.
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Bildt, supra note 72
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Nuuk Declaration, supra note 77, at 2. In so doing, the Arctic Council
finally institutionalized itself with the creation of an Arctic Council
Secretariat in Tromsø, Norway, a key element in transitioning the
Arctic Council from a cooperative group to an administrative one. Id.
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HotTopics/polar/Documents/Arctic2014/14.%20Prof.%20O.%20Young.
pdf.
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The IMO-mandated, Arctic Council-enforced Polar Code policing
regime would be a consistent program of inspection, certification, and
necessary quarantine by the competent agencies of each Arctic
Council state. The SAR Agreement already united these maritime
police agencies for a common purpose, including the United States
Coast Guard and the Russian Federal Agency for Maritime and River
Transport, and on a matter of such import to the Council, these
agencies can be bound together again for mutual maritime policing.
At any of the designated entry points into Arctic waters, ships would
submit themselves to an inspection by one of the named agencies to
ensure that they meet the requirements of the Polar Code, especially
those regarding ship design, lifesaving measures, and cold-weather
operations. If the enforcement agencies know that a particular ship
meets Polar class standards, as laid out in the Polar Code, then the
agency will permit that ship to enter Arctic waters. If a ship fails to
meet code, then it will be escorted to a port where it will be
quarantined and not permitted entry into Arctic waters.
The Arctic Council states must be the ones to carry out this task
because the IMO relies entirely on voluntary state party enforcement,
which can produce potentially catastrophic oversights. This risk is
best explained through the following hypothetical, whose reality is not
too far-fetched. Ten years from now, when enough of the Arctic
Ocean will be ice-free to permit more consistent transit of the entirety
of either the Northern Sea Route or the Northwest Passage, a
company in Southeast Asia contracts to ship hazardous industrial
materials from Europe to Vietnam by ocean freighter. The freighter,
flagged in Liberia, would be able to make the transit safely by way of
the Suez Canal, but to save time and expenses, decides to take the
Northern Sea Route, despite it not being properly outfitted per Polar
Code regulations. Taking that risk, but believing the conditions safe
enough to make the transit anyway, the ship leaves Rotterdam and
heads north for Norwegian waters and the Kara Gate. All is well
until it is well into the Arctic Circle, near the Norwegian-Russian
border, at which point an early winter squall hits the ship. Since it
does not meet Polar Code regulations, it is not insulated well-enough
to prevent the interior of the ship from dropping in temperature. As a
result, the engine starts malfunctioning due to the cold, and the Chief
Engineer turns it off to fix it. Now adrift, and without a pilot trained
for Polar waters, the ship is blown off-course and onto a poorly
charted rock formation, which breaches the hull. The Captain orders
the ship abandoned, but the lifeboats are neither built nor equipped
for the Arctic. Although all the crew get away safely, the cold and
wind cause two crew to succumb to the cold and two more to suffer
hypothermia before Russian forces can get to the scene and rescue the
crew Meanwhile, the abandoned ship starts leaking its hazardous
cargo into the water, which begins fouling the shoreline a few nautical
miles away. Despite receiving aid from the Norwegians, neither the
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Russians nor the Norwegians are able to easily stanch the leak of
hazardous chemicals into the water, and so the Russians must
commence an environmental cleanup. The Russian authorities file a
suit in admiralty against the shipowner for failure to maintain a
navigable ship, and although they win judgment, the recovery is
paltry compared to the cost of cleanup. At the end of all this, two
crew have died, one ship with cargo is lost, and Russia’s remote
northern shore has suffered hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of
environmental damage. If the Arctic Council states had police power
over enforcement of the Polar Code in the North Pole region, then
either Norwegian or Russian forces could have stopped the ship,
inspected it, found it out of compliance, and compelled it to dock at
the nearest port pending an adequate solution.
This scenario, while not an everyday one, is not unreasonable, and
has been one of the primary criticisms of the Polar Code as it exists
now: without an active enforcement mechanism and without a clear
protocol for retrofitting. 91 It also speaks to the current problem with
IMO regulation adherence: the means of enforcement and compliance.
The IMO concedes that it is voluntary, 92 and is classic problem of
sovereignty and international compliance described by Chayes and
Chayes: the competing systems of coercive enforcement and
compliance management. 93 In coercive enforcement, when one state
party violates the terms of an international treaty or regulatory
system, other state parties to the same treaty or regulatory system
impose monetary or other penalties on the offending state, intending
to compel compliance. In many instances, states may sign on to a
treaty with good intentions, but later decide that compliance is not
worth the benefits of membership if it can avoid the obligation.
The Polar Code may yet have issues that require coercive
enforcement, but the more likely problems with the Code would stem
from compliance management issues. In compliance management,
state parties perceive an obligation to follow an agreement to which
they have subscribed themselves, and so do not seek to violate the
terms of the agreement, unlike states that meet coercive enforcement.
However, the agreement itself may be flawed in either its structure or
91.

See IMO’s ‘Polar Code’ Ignores Environmental Dangers of Increased
Arctic and Antarctic Shipping, TRANSP. & ENV’T (Jan. 24, 2014, 2:21
PM),
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monitoring mechanisms, and so states may find themselves out of
compliance with an agreement due to misunderstandings about is
application. In such instances, Chayes and Chayes argue, attempting
to coerce compliance through sanctions is a costly and misguided
mistake. 94
This dilemma—not requiring sanctions but encountering
confusion regarding compliance—can be resolved through Arctic
Council enforcement, if applied properly. Individual states may not
have the capacity to conduct all the necessary inspections all the
time, but if an independent or commonly recognized entity carried out
the inspections, one that all parties respected and that followed a set
of accepted technical parameters, then that inspection entity could
better guarantee regulatory compliance. Here, the Arctic Council
forces would carry out the monitoring and compliance verification,
and if they had the power to escort noncomplying ships into port to
make the necessary changes, then over time the global shipping
community will recognize better the minimum standards and
monitoring mechanisms of the Code. Further, under this inspection
system, the standards for Code enforcement can start quite high,
which can help insure better global compliance. 95 A previous IMO
regulatory code, regarding marine oil pollution, suffered from lack of
compliance until the IMO changed the code to require separate ballast
tanks for oil and water. The change was costly to shipping lines, but
the cost of noncompliance rose very quickly as state parties like the
United States demanded full compliance, 96 and marine insurers and
protection & indemnity clubs (P & I) refused to grant coverage to
ships until they complied. 97 This need for high initial standards may
be essential, due to concerns that the Code does not adequately
address issues of pollution and retrofitting, 98 and the United States
has already begun analyzing how the Code will shape the safety,
security, and commercial interests and operations of American and
international corporations in the Arctic off Alaska. 99
94.
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See id. at 184.
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See id. at 185.
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2012).
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With the Polar Code, the costs to shipping lines for
noncompliance would be high, if someone actually monitors the ships.
If, for example, a Russian ship were to find a merchant carrier in the
Arctic in violation of the Code, it might escorted the ship to the port
of Arkhangelsk until the shipper came up with a solution. The
shipping line would then need to find a ship that was Polar Code
compliant to go to Arkhangelsk, have the cargo transferred from the
noncompliant ship to the compliant ship, then have the noncompliant
ship finish the trip, probably at a higher expense than expected.
Then, the shipping line would need to somehow get the noncompliant
ship out of Arkhangelsk—perhaps under special escort—then either
never send it into the Arctic again or retrofit it to meet Code prior to
another Arctic crossing. Since P & Is have already capped their
coverage of pollution damage from ship negligence, 100 the shipping
lines cannot afford to avoid compliance, lest they suffer from a horrific
accident such as the one described supra. Indeed, one Norwegian P &
I club has already stated that while the existing Code is a good step,
it cannot be the final expression of the IMO regarding commercial
shipping in the Arctic. 101 By comparison, the costs to the Arctic
Council states would most likely not be very high, and since the
Arctic Council already has provisions for mutual operations due to
the SAR Agreement, issues regarding coverage overlap and
operational expenses would be minimal, especially in comparison to
the cost of a horrific accident in the event of noncompliance.
This system would compel expanded compliance with the Polar
Code by shipping lines that might wish to skirt around IMO
regulatory requirements. The prospect that a line’s ship, with
valuable cargo, would be denied access to a valuable shipping route
would compel the lines into a calculation of the value of Polar Codecompliance compared to using longer sea routes. For those lines that
would find the Polar routes more attractive, the prospect of having
ships detained due to non-compliance with the Polar Code will
hopefully incentivize those lines to either order new ships that meet
the Polar Code, or to retrofit ships so that they come up to code. This
is especially important for those ships that use flags of convenience,
since shipping lines often use such registrations to avoid compliance
with strict maritime regulations. Now, with a uniform, regional
enforcement regime, these lines will have no choice but to abide by
the Polar Code.
This enforcement regime will put a burden on the Arctic Council
states, but they need to bear that burden for the sake of the Arctic.
The purpose of the Polar Code is to create “additional provisions
[beyond existing maritime regulations] deemed necessary…to take into
100. See HEALY ET AL., supra note 96, at 214.
101. See Gardner & Shalal-Esa, supra note 98.
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account the climactic conditions of polar waters and to meet
appropriate standards of maritime safety and pollution prevention.”102
The Arctic Council has already addressed some issues of maritime
safety through the SAR Agreement, and agreed within the past year
on a united response plan to marine oil pollution. 103 Both these
agreements require monitoring, response, and prevention capabilities
on the parts of the Arctic Council states, which presumably have the
capacity to fulfill all their stated obligations. As the Polar Code
bolsters these existing agreements, it behooves the Arctic Council to
assume a greater burden of enforcement responsibility if they wish to
ensure the future integrity of the Arctic.

V. Implications for the Future of the Arctic
If the IMO agrees to work together with the Arctic Council on
Polar Code enforcement, the Arctic Council can come into its own as
a stronger global leader in regional management. This precedent is
critical to the future of Arctic affairs because of how the rest of the
world will need to adapt to a more robust Arctic regime. The Arctic
is not a region sealed off from the rest of the world. To the contrary,
it is an economically expanding region, with commodities and tourism
on the rise, and a steadily growing need for reliable transportation. 104
With key actors coming from all parts of the world to engage in
Arctic activities, these actors may become discouraged if they
encounter a confusing or complex regulatory scheme for this emerging
region, one that may be unnecessarily burdensome. 105 Rather, the
Arctic Council and the IMO can assert to the world that the Arctic is
a region open to the world with certain necessary restrictions, if it is
to be conserved for the future. In this way, non-regional actors can
adapt their approach to the Arctic before they elect to economically
engage with the region.
While shipping and search and rescue agreements have had
widespread and consistent support, future Arctic Council issues will
likely be more contentious. The Council is already precluded from
addressing issues related to security, 106 and has consistently held itself
102. Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, supra note 54, at 4.
103. See generally ARCTIC COUNCIL, AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION ON
MARINE OIL POLLUTION PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE IN THE ARCTIC
(2013), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/eppr/agreement-oncooperation-on-marine-oil-pollution-preparedness-and-response-in-thearctic/.
104. See ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 72.
105. See JENSEN, supra note 3, at 5–6.
106. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
ARCTIC COUNCIL 2 (1996), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/
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out to be more concerned with issues of economics and the
environment. 107 This leaves open three major areas that touch on both
economics and the environment: fishing, mining, and oil drilling. The
last of these may prove to be the most contentious, given the drive by
certain Arctic Council states to expand their domestic energy
capacity. 108 The other two may face similar problems, since these are
income sources for residents of the North. Whether or not
international law will be able to assist the Arctic Council in
addressing these problems remains to be seen, since this pattern of
adapting existing law to the regional specifications of the Arctic is the
common pattern of successful Arctic Council action. It may be that
the Arctic Council will need to have a new mandate in the biennial
declarations, similar to the Nuuk Declaration mandate, that allows it
to craft new agreements where none exist in international law.
Further, since almost all of these issues will require the use of the
Arctic Ocean, the Polar Code may need to be regularly updated,
perhaps to include fishing activities in addition to commercial
shipping. For now, though, the Council has proven that its model of
regional management and enforcement can work.
The SAR
Agreement came into force this way, and cooperation with the IMO
on the Polar Code will only strengthen the position of the Arctic
Council for the future. In spite of some initial hesitation on the part
of the Council, it is ready to act in the name of Arctic welfare.

VI. Conclusion
The Arctic needs the Polar Code, and the Arctic Council must be
a part of the Polar Code. Although only seventy-one ships transited
the entire length of the Northern Sea Route in 2013, more than one
thousand entered Arctic waters for commercial purposes. 109 These
ships may bring benefits to the four million Arctic residents, but they
also pose special dangers to the Arctic waters and environment that
the international community has yet to encounter. The Polar Code is
the best chance to ensure the future integrity of the Arctic in the face
of increased commercial activity, but the only clear method of
ensuring the Code’s full effect is for the IMO to incorporate the Arctic
index.php/en/document-archive/category/4-founding-documents
[hereinafter Ottawa Declaration].
107. See About the Arctic Council, supra note 83.
108. See Andrew E. Kramer & Clifford Krauss, Russia Embraces Offshore
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2011),
http://
Arctic
Drilling,
N.Y.
www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/business/global/16arctic.html?pagewante
d=all; see EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
THE
ARCTIC REGION 5 (May 2013), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy. pdf.
109. See Gardner & Shalal-Esa, supra note 98.
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Council as an entity into the Code’s enforcement and success. Arctic
experts have already indicated the importance of incorporating the
Council, 110 and already individual Council states have begun the
process of analyzing the Code to see how they can best adapt to its
mandates. 111 But Canada, Norway, and the United States cannot
complete the task alone—they need the partnership of all the Arctic
Council states, which necessarily requires the Council as an
international institution to act in partnership with the IMO. Arctic
Council enforcement of the Code will ensure that shipping lines come
into compliance with the Code, help minimize the effects of using
flags of convenience to avoid potentially costly yet safe retrofits to
ships, and ensure that the expanding Arctic maintains its core
environmental integrity. If the Arctic Council states will not enforce
the Code, then too many noncompliant ships will slip through, and
given the rise of Arctic oil drilling, only one ship needs to have an
accident to experience another Exxon Valdez. The IMO must embrace
the concept of active enforcement of its regulations, and the Arctic
Council can and should act to enforce the Polar Code, not only for
themselves, but for the rest of the world.

110. See Young, supra note 87.
111. See Gardner & Shalal-Esa, supra note 98.
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